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The Bahamas
The new Trustee Act
by Peter D Maynard
O ver the past decade, the Bahamas has continued to take steps to polish and update its image as a major international financial centre. These steps include the 
enactment of a wide array of statutes and their associated 
regulations, such as the Trusts (Choice of Governing Law) Act 1989 
and the Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991, the first of which helps 
resist forced heirship claims and both of which help to establish 
so-called asset protection trusts. Then, there are the International 
Business Companies Act 1989, the Companies Act 1992, the 
Perpetuities Act 1995, the Mutual Funds Act 1995, the Exempted 
Limited Partnership Act 1995, the Securities Board Act 1995 and the 
Securities Industry Act. There is also a new Limitation Act 1995, and 
the Money Laundering (Proceeds oj Crime) Act 1996 which 
discourages money laundering in the Bahamas.
Another such step is the introduction of a new comprehensive 
code governing trustees, the Trustee Act 1998 ('the Act'). This 
article deals with some of the important provisions of this new 
legislation.o
Trusts frequently own companies or international business 
companies as another level of confidentiality or for other reasons 
associated with financial or estate planning.
The old repealed Trustee Act (Ch. 164) had been in effect 
since 1893. The Act came into force on 27 July 1998 and not 
only replaces the 1893 Act but also repeals the old Trustee 
Appointment Act as well as the Variation of Trusts Act. The Act 
consists of 99 sections and 2 schedules, as compared with the 54 
sections of the old Trustee Act. It is divided into seven parts: 
preliminary; investments; general powers of trustees and 
personal representatives; appointment and discharge of trustees; 
powers of court; special provisions and fiscal and regulatory 
provisions. The schedules cover model trust provisions and list 
the two aforementioned repealed acts as having been repealed.
'Sham' trusts are dealt with in the well known Rahman v Chase 
Bank Trust Company case, where the Jersey Court held a trust to 
be a 'sham' because the settlor retained full control over the 
trust assets during his lifetime. There is also a danger that such 
a trust could be construed as a will, and, if not executed in 
accordance with the Wills Act of the settlor's country of 
domicile, be held invalid.
Section 3 of the Act should adequately protect all trusts 
created in, and having their assets in, this jurisdiction. Where 
such trusts have assets located in another jurisdiction, which is 
quite often the case, there is a risk that the courts of such other 
jurisdiction might not recognize the relationship as a trust, but 
instead hold the relationship to be an entirely different legal 
relationship, such as a bailment, nominees or an agency.
While trustees may, in their discretion, invest trust funds in 
the same manner as individual owners absolutely entitled, s. 5 
adopts 'the prudent investor rule' commonly used in the USA 
and some other jurisdictions. Sections 4 through 12 of the Act 
deal with investments by trustees.
Many sections in the Act apply only when a contrary intention 
is not expressed in the trust instrument, in which case trustees 
should, where appropriate, give settlors of new trusts the 
opportunity to express such a contrary intention.
Trustees shall not be liable for breach of trust by reason onlv 
of their continuing to hold investments which have ceased to be 
authorised investments. They are empowered to insure against 
personal liabilities which they may incur in the execution of their 
trusts, and they may effect fidelity insurance for a person whom 
they employ in their capacity as trustees. The premiums for any 
such insurances may be paid out the capital or income of the 
trust property at the discretion of the trustees. However, this 
shall not extend to insurance against any personal liabilities 
which the trustees may incur to any beneficiaries as such for 
breach of trust or otherwise.
Regarding the powers of trustees to employ agents and to 
delegate trusts, the power to appoint agents is quite extensive. 
Section 30(5) allows trustees to recover all charges and expenses 
paid to agents from the capital or income of the trust fund and 
subsections (6) and (7) provide that:
'Trustees who make reasonable efforts to satisfy themselves that an 
agent has appropriate knowledge, experience and integrity shall not be 
chargeable with breach of trust or being responsible Jor any loss by 
reason only oj their having appointed the agent or joined or concurred 
in that appointment.' (s. 30(6))
and
'Trustees who have made reasonable ejforts to keep themselves 
informed concerning the performance of an agent shall not be liable or 
responsible Jor any dejault or wrongful act of the agent which occurs at a 
time when the agent appeared to the trustees to be performing honestly 
and competently.' (s. 30(7))
A trustee may, notwithstanding any rule of law or equity to the 
contrary, but only if expressly so permitted by the trust 
instrument, by power of attorney or any other written 
instrument, delegate, to any person outside the Bahamas or to 
any person in the Bahamas while the trustee is absent, the 
execution or exercise of all or any trusts, powers and discretions 
vested in him as such trustee either alone or jointly with any 
other person. Any delegate so appointed shall be considered an 
agent ot the trustee for the purposes of subsections (6) and (7) 
ofs. 30.
Alienation is not presently allowed. Section 40(1) provides 
that, notwithstanding any rule of law or equity to the contrary, it 
shall be lawful for an instrument or disposition to provide that 
any estate or interest in any property given to any individual as 
beneficiary shall not during the life of that beneficiary, or such 
lesser period as may be specified in the instrument or 
disposition, be alienated or pass by bankruptcy, insolvency or 
liquidation or be liable to be seized, sold attached, or taken in 
execution by process ot law and where so provided such 29
provision shall take effect accordingly. However, neither the 
settlor nor any other person donating property to a trust may 
benefit from the provisions of s. 40.
Regarding the vesting of trust property in new or continuing 
trustees s. 47 provides that where a corporate trustee is merged 
or amalgamated with another corporate trustee then on the date 
when such merger or amalgamation takes effect all trusto o
property held by the non-surviving trustee shall automatically 
and without any action on the part of either trustee vest in the 
surviving trustee unless the trust instrument specifically 
prohibits the removal of a trustee and the appointment of a new 
trustee or requires the consent or approval of a person and such 
consent or approval shall not have been obtained or such vesting 
would result in the abrogation of any rights, conditions, terms oro J o ' '
provisions contained in such instrument or any instrument 
effectively amending such instrument.
The Court may vary trusts in much the same way as it could 
under the repealed Variation of Trusts Act except that, unlike the 
latter Act which required the applicant to prove that the 
proposed variation is for his benefit, the new s. 70 merely 
provides that the Court shall not approve an arrangement on 
behalf of any person if carrying it out would be detrimental to 
that person. In the past it has quite often been difficult to show 
a precise benefit in every instance.
Regarding purpose trusts, which have been quite popular in 
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, among other jurisdictions, 
for a number or years, the main requirements are that they be 
for some abstract and impersonal purpose or purposes other 
than an exclusively charitable purpose, that it is not for the direct 
or indirect benefit of any particular ascertainable persons or 
class of persons (whether or not immediately ascertainable), that 
it be enforceable in the manner specified in the relevant section 
by a person duly appointed to enforce it and that a designated 
person is a trustee of the trust. 'Designated persons' include 
licensees under the Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Act as 
well as local accountants and attorneys.
Regarding disclosure to beneficiaries or their right to beo o o
informed of the existence of a trust and to receive trust 
information and copies of trust documents, it is now well 
established at common law that beneficiaries of fixed or express 
trusts, i.e. beneficiaries with vested or contingent interests, as7 o
well as beneficiaries of discretionary trusts, because of their 
proprietary rights or the obligation of trustees to account to 
them, are entitled to be informed of the existence of the trust 
and to receive trust information and copies of trust documents, 
including accounts. Discretionary beneficiaries are not entitled 
to see minutes of meetings or any other documents containing 
the deliberations of the trustees in connection with the exercise 
of their discretions. Also, trustees are not required to disclose 
the existence of a discretionary power of appointment to the 
objects of the same or to provide them with any trust 
information or documents as the trustees are under no 
obligation whatsoever to exercise such power in their favour and 
may choose never to do so.
While there is no objection to making disclosures to 
beneficiaries with vested interests and providing them with trust 
information and documents, there are some circumstances 
when it is not desirable to do so, in the case of discretionary 
beneficiaries or beneficiaries having contingent interests.
Settlors do not always wish discretionary beneficiaries to be 
informed of a trust's existence, especially when they are 
concerned about forced heirship rights in their own country, the 
class of beneficiaries is extremely broad and the settlor does not 
intend many of them to receive benefits under the trust, or the 
trust is a 'blind' trust with charities named but whom the settlor 
never intended to benefit. Section 83 seeks to help settlors in 
this area by providing that trustees shall be under no legal 
obligation to disclose the existence of the trust to beneficiaries
O
having no vested interest, or an interest that is contingent upon 
the occurrence of some event, if the trustees deem such 
disclosure not to be in the interest of the trust.
CONTRARY INTENTION
Many sections in the Act apply only when a contrary intention is not 
expressed in the trust instrument, in which case trustees should, 
where appropriate, give settlors of new trusts the opportunity to 
express such a contrary intention.
Furthermore, the obligation to disclose the existence of the 
trust to minor or mentally incapacitated beneficiaries (or their 
legal representatives) having vested interests is subject to the 
caveat that the trustees may choose not to disclose if they deem 
such disclosure not to be in the best interests of such 
beneficiaries.
The information that must be disclosed to beneficiaries having 
a vested interest in the trust is specifically detailed in subsection 
(5). In disclosing information express provision is made for 
preserving the right to confidentiality of the other beneficiaries. 
For the avoidance of doubt, subsection (8) specifically provides 
that the trustees shall be under no obligation to disclose to any 
person who is the object of a discretionary power, the existence 
of such power or to disclose any information concerning such 
power (or the trust) to any such person.
Section 83 also requires trustees to effect disclosure where 
the trust instrument so provides and to deny requests for 
information from beneficiaries having no vested or contingent 
interests where so required by the trust instrument. Provision is 
also made for the non-disclosure of documents which would 
reveal the deliberations of trustees and the reasons for the 
exercise or non-exercise of any power or discretion, the non- 
disclosure of memoranda or letters of wishes and for trustees 
not to be forced by any process of discovery to make any such 
disclosure.
Any attempt, by statute or otherwise, to restrict the 
information rights of beneficiaries could be held by a court of 
law to be repugnant to the original intention of settlors to confer 
equitable rights upon the beneficiaries and also repugnant to the 
trustee's basic duty of accountability. A possible way around this 
might be to appoint a protector to exercise or enforce such 
rights to information. However, this might not work as the 
protector could be held to have a fiduciary obligation to pass 
such information on to the beneficiaries. One has to wait and 
see how this innovative section of the Act holds up in our courts 
and those of other common law jurisdictions.
Regarding the problem which arose as a result of the 
well-known case of Saunders v Vautier [1835 42] All ER Rep 58, 
the rule in this case allows a beneficiary, having attained his 
majority and not being incapacitated, or all of the beneficiaries,
being more than one and having attained their majorities and 
not being incapacitated, to call for the distribution of his or their 
share or shares in the trust even though the settlor required 
distribution at a later age but did not provide for a gift over in 
the event of the prior death of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.
Trust duty is payable in the sum of $50.00 on each trust 
instrument instead of stamp duty. Beneficiaries who are treated 
as non-residents for exchange control purposes are exempted 
from income taxes and other similar taxes on trust distributions. 
Where all of the beneficiaries of a trust are so treated, the trust 
instrument and other trust documents described in s. 93 will be 
exempt from stamp duty unless the trust property includes land 
in the Bahamas or the trust carries on a business or trade in the 
Bahamas.
Trust instruments and certain other trust documents are 
exempt from registration under the Registration of Records Act. 
The Exchange Control Regulations Act shall not apply to 
any settlor, grantor, donor or beneficiary who is treated as
non-resident for exchange control purposes. The ECRA, except 
where otherwise expressly provided, applies to trusts, including 
executorship, constituted or created either before or after the 
commencement of the Trustee Act.
The Act helps to move the Bahamas to the cutting edge of 
innovative international trust legislation. It dramatically 
improves the image and reputation of the country as an 
important international financial centre and is another 
important reaffirmation of the country's interest in and 
commitment to responsibility, clean money and good trust 
business. ©
Dr Peter D Maynard
Peter D Maynard S^ Company, Nassau, Bahamas
Comment
Pension problems: who owes whom?
by John A Franks
Much has been made in the media by the present government 
of the alleged mis-selling ofo o
private pension schemes to 
individuals.
The problem arises because there 
may be a shortfall in the value 
and, therefore, the ultimate 
return which individuals had 
been led to expect. If so, loss can 
John A Franks be measured in the difference in 
value so long as what is now the entitlement is less. The cause 
of the shortfall in this context appears to be twofold:
(1) the way charges for selling and managing the policy and the 
funds it represents were deducted from the premiums at 
the outset. The policy earnings, particularly in the first 
years, were lowered and this would mean early surrender 
values were depressed. It is said that this should have been 
explained;
(2) in many cases, the fact that the employee who committed 
to a staff pension scheme may have been disadvantaged 
when he took out a private pension in place of an 
occupational pension because of the loss of the employer's 
contribution (which would not be made to the individual's 
personal policy scheme) and the employee could no longer 
rely on the employer's legal duty to subvent the staff fund 
if the pension fund was inadequate.
However, there are other considerations of which account 
should be taken. There is the cost of portability of the rights to
the corporate-funded pension. The individual scheme is wholly 
outwith the control of the employer and the company pension 
fund trustees. Moreover, there are no 'Maxwell-type' risks 
where the pension fund may be raided or particular assets 
alienated or hypothecated. Even to this day, 'stock lending' by 
pension fund trustees has not been outlawed. Also, where the 
pension fund has surplus value, this can be tapped by the 
employer taking a contribution holiday. With individual 
schemes, growth is likely to benefit the pensioner. For 
individuals who switch to a personal scheme, there is, therefore, 
not only a greater feeling of security, but no hassle over transfer 
values to be passed from the fund of the old employer to that of 
the new employer. Where an employer no longer makes a 
contribution, this may well be taken into account in dealing 
with the employee's emoluments at review in some other way.
Another factor is 'mis-selling' on the part of the government 
in regard to its treatment of individuals over SERFS. The market 
for switching to private pensions was stimulated by the desire of 
government to be relieved of the future unfunded liabilities for 
state additional pension schemes. A premium was offered by 
government as a contribution to private schemes to encourage 
change by individuals. If the current government campaign has 
any validity, the government was at fault not to issue at least 
'health warnings' against the mischiefs which are said to justify 
claims for mis-selling being made. Will the government accept 
liability for mis-selling pensioners back into SERFS or will they 
resile from the reduction in widows' pensions?
At the same time as releasing what might be regarded aso o o
divisive allegations to thousands, the government is taking careo ' o o
to withdraw the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme. This will mean 31
